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A frequently asked question is, how informationally efficient are market prices?
In answering this question, economists commonly model the price formation process
as one of tâtonnement where agents revise their beliefs until a market-clearing price
is established.  The Walrasian market thus aggregates all relevant information about
an asset and yields a strong-form efficient price.  A second approach, consistent with
the structure of some modern-day securities markets, is to utilize a competitive dealer
framework where traders submit orders to market makers who compete for trades.
Using the demand and supply orders from agents, market makers compile informa-
tion by first aggregating demand and, second, by using it as a conditioning variable
to determine future payoffs and price.
This paper constrasts the Walrasian and competitive market structures.  The
motivation for this analysis is threefold:  First, it is common for empiricists to as-
sume rational expectations markets in forming their hypotheses, even for markets
such as the NASDAQ, which are clearly not Walrasian.  It is important to know that
this assumption does not adversely affect the validity of empirical results.  Second,
economists sometimes employ the notion of the rational expectations equilibrium.
By contrasting the two market structures, it is possible to infer that prices formu-
lated in markets are indeed rational, and empirical studies that use market data
have the underlying assumption of rationality.  Third, the analysis shows that ag-
gregating information is a double-edged sword because on one hand it leads to infor-
mative prices, but simultaneously, markets can aggregate information so well that
there is no incentive to obtain information in the first place (consistent with Grossman
[1976]), a result that implies market failure from an informational perspective.
The results demonstrate that competing market makers aggregate information
so that market participants have ex post homogeneous expectations and equilibrium
price is strong-form efficient.  Specifically, it is shown that a competitive dealer sys-
tem mimics the behavior of a Walrasian rational expectations market when the idio-
syncratic error components of private signals are identically and independently dis-
tributed, risk-averse agents trade to maximize expected utility of terminal wealth,
and aggregate demand is equated to supply.
These results are obtained from the simultaneous development of two equilib-
rium pricing models.  For both economies, the market is defined as one with a single
type of agent: informed traders receive private signals regarding the future value of
a risky asset where the signal is the true value of the asset plus an idiosyncratic594 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
error.  Although each agent trades to maximize expected utility of end-of-period
wealth given his information set, equilibrium price is established through different
processes.  In a competitive dealer environment, market makers set price as a condi-
tional expectation of aggregate demand formed from market orders.  Moreover, un-
der perfect competition between market makers, the expected profit on any trade is
zero.
The Walrasian equilibrium is rational expectations in the sense that agents con-
jecture an equilibrium price that contains an average of private signals as in Grossman
[1976].  If competitive dealers can observe aggregate demand, they are observing the
full set of market information and the resulting price is efficient.  Like Grossman’s
equilibrium price, competitive dealers form a price that summarizes all information
so that it is strong-form efficient and a sufficient statistic for future payoff value.
Given the difference between the information sets but a common level of effi-
ciency, it can be argued that the economic role of competitive dealers is to rationally
aggregate market information.  Specifically, in a competitive market it is not neces-
sary for agents to conjecture an equilibrium price (that is, to guess what each other
agent believes and the functional form of price) because market makers summarize
the market’s information for them.  Critical to this result is market makers’ ability to
“learn” by observing trades.  Despite the informational efficiency of price the com-
petitive market structure has a perverse outcome: market makers become “better
informed” than any individual with private information.  While this is “good news”
for supporters of the efficient market hypothesis, it is a disincentive for private indi-
viduals to obtain costly information.
The finding that a competitive market maker structure produces an informa-
tional efficient pricing system bodes well for a market structure such as the NASDAQ.
In that market, traders submit demands for posted bid and ask prices.  Market mak-
ers subsequently compete for trades by lowering the “ask” price and raising the “bid”
price (or narrowing the spread).  The ensuing competition promotes trade, and since
each trade reveals information, market makers learn about the private set of infor-
mation until they know almost all that there is to know about future payoffs.  That
is, they know the vector of private signals and can average across private signals to
obtain a noisy estimate of the future payoff value.  Even though informed agents
know that they reveal their private information when they trade, they submit orders
because their information is short-lived.  Therefore, whatever private information
exists must be exploited in the current period, or will expire and be worthless at the
end of the first trading period. (The notion of trading strategically across periods for
the purpose of camouflaging private information is discussed by Kyle [1985].)
Consider the concept of informational efficiency in the context of recent market
events.  During the week of 10-14 April 2000 the NASDAQ suffered a 35 percent
correction.  Given this event, some relevant questions are:  “If the pricing system is
so efficient, why did such a large correction occur?  Moreover, when did price-earn-
ing multiples of, say, 31 become appropriate when historically they have been about
15?  Surely, market prices are artificially high and thus inefficient.”  The logic stem-
ming from this analysis is that the problem is not necessarily with the market struc-
ture.  Instead, the problem is with the precision of information, or even bias within595 COMPETITIVE MARKETS AND AGGREGATE INFORMATION
the information.  The existence of an equilibrium price does not preclude the possi-
bility of price under- or overreacting to information.  In this economy, agents learn
from each other–they do not ask whether there is bias attached to the information,
nor do they have the means to detect it.  When agents receive high quality signals,
and they are not consistent with current price levels, prices will adjust as they did
that week.  It is not a matter of an informationally inefficient market structure–it is
a matter of garbage in, garbage out.
In addition to showing that competitive market makers efficiently aggregate
individuals’ private information, the following list describes characteristics of that
equilibrium:
1. Equilibrium price contains a weighted-average of prior and posterior beliefs about
the asset’s future value where the posterior is an average of informed agents’
private signals.  Moreover, the price revision process is partially Bayesian, be-
cause supply shocks shift the market-clearing price.
2. The revision parameter in a competitive dealer equilibrium price is related to
the proportion of “new” information impounded in price.
3. In a small economy, price can be driven away from its intrinsic value by an
average error as in DeLong [1990].  In a large economy price is equated to its
intrinsic value since the Strong Law of Large Numbers produces an average
error of zero and infinite precision of signals, (that is, agents become perfectly
informed).
4. And most importantly, a competitive dealer market structure yields a price that
summarizes all relevant information, so that it is a sufficient statistic.
The literature has begun to investigate the quality of information used to value
securities and the behavior of market participants.  For example, Daniel, Hirshleifer
and Subrahmanyam [1998] and Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny [1998] present theo-
retical models of investor behavior that show how deviations from intrinsic values
can occur.  As well, the bull market and (less frequently) bear market phenomena
have precipitated research on how noisy or even biased information spreads across
traders [Baigent and Acar, 2000].  The good news is that, in the long run, prices tend
to move toward their intrinsic values [DeBondt and Thaler, 1985 and Fama, 1991]–
the bad news is that it might take some time to arrive at that value.
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
Economic Structure
Grossman [1976] considers an economy with two tradable assets: a risk-free as-
set with known rate of return and a risky asset with unknown future value.  In-
formed agents, indexed by, i = 1, 2, …, n, , allocate their initial wealth, W0i, between
the safe and risky asset.  The budget constraint is given by W0i + XFi + P0X0 , where
XFi is the amount invested in the safe assets, and  Xi is the number of shares of the
risky asset purchased or sold at current price, P0.  The safe asset yields one plus a596 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
risk-free rate of return r (normalized to zero for convenience), and the risky asset
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~
1i, is given by
(1)  W
~





1    P0)Xi.
At time 0 all agents receive a private information set, Ii, regarding the future
value of the risky asset.  A portion of the information set is a private signal, yi, which
takes the form of the true payoff value,  P1, plus an idiosyncratic error, εi, that is,
(2) yi = P1 + εi,
where  εi, ~ N(0,1) and E(εiεj) = E(εi)E(εj)  = 0,  i  j.
In equation (2), the presence of εi, reflects errors of judgment that prevent agents
from knowing perfectly the future value of the risky asset.1
The equilibrium prices developed subsequently require that the information sets
differ between the two markets. In a competitive dealer market, informed agents
have the information set Ii  yi which produces equilibrium price Pc
1 (y).  In contrast,
agents who participate in a Walrasian market have an information set Ii  [yi, P0
w(y)]
where P0
w(y) is the conjectured equilibrium price, and y  (y1 ... yn) is the complete set
of private signals (or market information).  The difference between the two informa-
tion sets reflects the absence (presence) of a market maker.  It is shown that in a
competitive dealer market, y is aggregated by market makers so that individuals
require only their private signals.  Conversely, forming a sufficient statistic price in
a Walrasian market requires the addition of conjectured equilibrium price.  This
result is discussed in greater detail in a later section.
Given their information, Ii, informed traders maximize expected utility of end-
of-period wealth.  The standard assumption that utility of end-of-period wealth is a
negative exponential function, U(W
~
1i) =  exp(   W
~
1i ), and normally distributed end-
of-period wealth, W
~
1i , is employed.
Assuming conditional normality for terminal wealth, maximizing terminal wealth
with respect to demand for the risky asset, Xi, yields a familiar demand equation for
the risky asset
(3) Xi =  [E(P
~
1 |Ii)   P0]/[(aVar(P
~
1 |Ii)].
Hereafter, equilibrium price carries a superscript “w” or “c” representing Walrasian
or competitive market structures.
Equilibrium Prices
In this section it is shown that both a Walrasian rational expectations market
structure and a competitive dealer market structure yield informationally identi-597 COMPETITIVE MARKETS AND AGGREGATE INFORMATION
cally efficient prices.   In this analysis the sufficient statistic characteristic of price,
initially shown by Grossman [1976], is a non-trivial result.  If informed agents can
extract the average signal from equilibrium price, they can learn all there is to know
about the future payoff value of a security.  In this context, individual signals be-
come extraneous information since agents can form expectations about future value
using the average signal, with the same precision as using both private signals and
equilibrium price.  Price, therefore, is strong-form efficient.  Derivation of two equi-
librium prices is to follow.
Walrasian Equilibrium
Grossman [1976] presents the following equilibrium model.  To form a rational
expectations equilibrium it is assumed that agents have an information set.  This
equilibrium requires that agents conjecture a price
(4a) Py
w
00 1 =+ αα where,
(4b) yy n i i
n
=
= ∑ 1 ,
(4c) ασ σ 01
12 2 1 =− () + ()
− Pn Sn / , and
(4d)  1 = n 2/(n 2 + 1).
The remainder of the proof requires that price be a sufficient statistic.  That is, if
informed agents know all market parameters, they can extract the average signal
from price and form expectations of the future value of the risky asset with the same
precision as using both private signals and price.  In (4c)-(4d), ai = 1  i = 1, n. j..
Moreover, it is easy to show that substituting for  Iy i =  (the sufficient statistic con-
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Equation (5) shows that equilibrium price is formed through a Bayesian updat-
ing process.  The first two terms in (5) are a weighted-average of prior  P 1 ()  and
posterior  y ()  information.  Further, ai reflects the proportion of “new” information, y ,
embedded in price.
In this equilibrium, price is determined when informed agents make a conjec-
ture about price.  The result of this conjecture is ex post homogeneous expectations
because, after equilibrium price is determined, all agents can use the same quantity,
average signal,  y , to form expectations about the future payoff value of the risky598 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
asset.  Moreover, equilibrium price is fully revealing of informed agents’ private
signals.  That is, agents observe  yP =+ 1 ε .  Because  is unobservable, the future
payoff value, P1, is also unobservable.
Competitive Dealer Equilibrium
Here, equilibrium price is formed in a competitive dealer market.  To compute
this result, return to the demand equation (3) and let Ii = yi  so that individual i’s
demand for the risky asset is (6) and where each agent is a price taker
(6) Xi =  [E(P
~




Excess demand (or order flow) is  XS i i
n
= ∑ −
1  where supply is assumed to be an
exogenous and fixed shock.  Market makers use a linear pricing schedule (7) as in
Kyle [1985] and Admati and Pfeiderer [1988].  Equation (7) is of the form P0
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)]   n S'.  This construct has two important proper-
ties:  it is efficient and it is regret-free.  The regret-free property implies a zero
expected profit on any given trade.
(7)
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) =  2/( 2 + n 1) and S' = n 1S.
 Aggregating demand from (6) and using the terminal condition (7) results in
equilibrium price (8a, b)
(8a) Py P n y P n S
c
01 1 () =+ − () − ′ λλ (See appendix for proof.)
Substituting for   =  2/( 2 + n 1) and simplifying yields an equilibrium price (8b).
(8b) Py P n nyn Sn
c
01
22 2 2 2 11 1 () / / / =+ () ++ () −+ () σσ σ σ σ
The Market Makers’ Dilemma
The problem confronting each dealer is that they do not have private informa-
tion about the future value of the risky asset, but must trade with individuals who
have private information.  Because they are at an informational disadvantage, they
must (1) learn from those with private information and (2) provide compensation for
their potential losses.  Each of these issues is dealt with in turn.
First, consider the process by which dealers learn from the trades of informed
individuals.  It is suggested that the conditioning variable should be the average
demand for the risky asset,  X , because it is more informative than individual trades.599 COMPETITIVE MARKETS AND AGGREGATE INFORMATION
Each individual has signal yi with variance  2( 2 + 1) 1.  While it is possible to extract
individual signals, market makers should prefer to average across demand and ex-
tract the average signal,  y , with variance  2( 2 + n 1) 1.  The intuition for using
average demand is clear—the average signal has greater “precision” than individual
signals where precision is defined as the reciprocal of the variance.  (Further, it is
easy to show that conditioning on  X  is identical to extracting the average signal and
using it as a conditioning variable.)
Access to aggregate demand implies that market makers learn as much as pos-
sible from informed traders to know about the future payoff value for the risky asset.
The perverse result, however, is that market makers become “better informed” than
those with private information after performing the necessary calculus.  Therein lies
the dilemma noted by Grossman [1976].  In a Walrasian market private information
is revealed in equilibrium price.  Alternatively, in the competitive market structure,
market makers learn all that there is to know about payoffs.  Consequently, there is
no incentive to obtain private information, particularly if it is costly (as in Grossman
and Stiglitz [1980].
The second issue raised above is now addressed; market makers must provide
compensation for potential losses to informed traders.  Note that in equation (7), the
revision parameter,  , has two complementary roles.  First, it reflects the amount of
new information embedded in price through excess demand.  Second, it represents
the market makers’ compensation for bearing the risk of trading with individuals
who have private information (that is, the adverse selection cost).  If excess demand
is  1 unit, then  PP 01 =± λ.  The higher price represents the “ask” and the lower
price represents the “bid.”  Also, if we consider the general form of    =  2( 2 + n 1 ε
2) 1
we can see two interesting effects.  First, as the precision of informed traders’ infor-
mation increases ( ε
2 decreases), the bid-ask spread increases since       ε
2 < 0.  Sec-
ond, as the number of traders increases, the bid-ask spread increases because the
potential losses are larger (     n > 0).
DISCUSSION OF EQUILIBRIUM PROCESSES
Since equations (5) and (8b) are both sufficient statistics for the vector of private
signals, the main point of this paper has been proven–there are two ways to form a
sufficient statistic price.  One is through rational expectations and a second is through
a competitive dealer framework.  In the latter case, competing market makers per-
form the task of fully aggregating the market’s information set.  This task is accom-
plished by observing demand.  Since demand is based on private signals, observing
each agent’s demand and averaging across individual demands allows for the forma-
tion of a noisy estimate of the asset’s intrinsic value.  That is, through observing
demand, market makers learn from those with private information and their ad-
verse selection problem is mitigated.  (The intuition of this statement is discussed at
length in Glosten [1989] who suggests that when the adverse selection cost is high,
transactions costs are correspondingly high to compensate market makers for poten-
tial losses on informed trades.)600 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
WALRASIAN PRICE VERSUS COMPETITIVE DEALER PRICE
A comparison of the two equilibrium prices reveals several interesting proper-
ties.  First, the Walrasian auctioneer has one objective–to clear the market.  In con-
trast, competitive dealers establish an informative price while competing for trades.
The motivation for trades occurs because market makers have an informational ad-
vantage over any given individual trader.  Both market structures provide a suffi-
cient statistic price, however, there is a slight difference between the two prices.
Consider the difference in prices shown in equation (9) below:
(9)   = P0
c    P0
w  =  [ 2S/(n 2 + 1)][(n   1)/n] < 0.
Equation (9) reveals that as long as supply is positive, competitive dealers un-
der-price the Walrasian auctioneer.  The intuition of this result is that dealers are
competitive and lower prices to attract trades, and is a reflection of their differing
roles–the Walrasian auctioneer has the purpose of setting a market clearing price in
contrast to dealers who compete for trades.  Moreover, the difference in price implies
that the bid-ask spread will be lower and competition among dealers has a social
benefit (lower transactions costs).  In a large economy, the two prices converge so
that both are fully revealing of the future payoff value.  That is, lim δ
n→∞
≈ 0 , and  P0
c   
P0
w  = P0    .
The second observation is that both prices reflect the same amount of new infor-
mation in price so that the efficiency of each price is identical.  Kyle [1985] defines
price efficiency as the reciprocal of the variance of future payoff conditioned on equi-
librium price.  That is, efficiency is   = [Var(P
~
1 |P0)] 1.  Then,
 w =  c;
{Var(P
~




w)]} 1 = {Var(P
~





(10) [ 2/(n 2 + 1)] 1  = [ 2/(n 2 + 1)] 1 ;
(n 2 + 1)/ 2  = (n 2 + 1)/ 2.
Finally, note that for each price the conditional variance is less than the uncondi-
tional variance so that price is informationally efficient, that is,  2/(n 2 + 1)21 <  2.
FURTHER RESEARCH ISSUES
Other issues of concern are the quality of information, regulatory problems, and
the effect of Electronic Communications Networks.3  Each of these issues is discussed
in below.601 COMPETITIVE MARKETS AND AGGREGATE INFORMATION
Quality of Information
The information structure is assumed to be comprised of a private signal plus an
idiosyncratic error for each individual market participant (equation 2).  Moreover,
the idiosyncratic portion of signals (the error terms) are assumed to be identically
and independently distributed.  This suggests that all individuals have the same
“skill” at processing the information they are given, or that all traders have the same
precision.  In a pragmatic sense, this cannot be true, and would be manifested in
demand for the risky asset (equation 3).  The greater the precision of the signal, the
higher (lower) the demand associated with “good” (“bad”) news.  Thus, with greater
precision, individuals will trade more aggressively.  At the limit, when precision is
infinite (perfect information), price is equal to its intrinsic value and there is no
trade (as in Milgrom and Stokey [1982]).
It could also be assumed that signals are not formed independently.  Allowing for
a positive correlation of idiosyncratic errors is tantamount to suggesting that indi-
viduals systematically bias “good” news and “bad” news.  It does not prohibit the
formation of either a Walrasian or competitive dealer equilibrium, but it does pre-
vent price from fully converging to its intrinsic value, even under large economy
assumptions.  A further change that would affect price formation is to allow supply
to be random, instead of fixed and known as currently modeled.  Changing this
assumption does not allow a Walrasian equilibrium to be found, but a competitive
dealer market equilibrium still exists.
Regulatory Issues
The Securities and Exchange Commission has established practices that pro-
mote “full disclosure;” however, it is clear that as corporations become more complex,
accurately reporting the state of the firm is more arduous and subject to interpreta-
tion.  Certainly Enron Energy Corporation and Global Crossing are examples of how
information can be misleading or even withheld from investors with devastating
results, but these are not the first of such cases (for example, Sunbeam, Waste Man-
agement, Boston Chicken, BreX).  Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker
has suggested that there is a conflict of interest between counseling and auditing a
firm, and to remedy the conflict, counseling and auditing should not be undertaken
by the same consulting firm.  How the suggestion of severing activities will be per-
ceived, especially after the long fight to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, is currently
unknown.  What is known is that, when full information is eventually disclosed,
markets establish an appropriate price.  Unfortunately, the time elapsed before that
terminal price is revealed may be substantial, and there could be a significant trans-
fer of wealth.
In addition to auditing and counseling, new firms pose a greater problem be-
cause they have no historical information to report.  Financial statements (balance
sheets, income statements and statements of cash flows) cannot exist for a new firm
so that the only source of information is analyst forecasts.  Currently, the literature
is pointing to biases within that information structure [Dreman and Berry, 1995].
As noted earlier, the efficient market hypothesis only posits that information be602 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
embedded in prices quickly and fully.  It does not speak to the issue of what informa-
tion is included, nor to the issue of how well participants regulate themselves in the
production of information.
Electronic Communications Networks
Mr. Joel Steinmetz, Senior Vice President of Instinet made the following com-
ments to the Sub-Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection:
As an important part of its services to clients, Instinet acts as an
electronic communications network, or “ECN.”   ECNs are electronic
marketplaces that allow institutional, retail and professional market
participants to trade securities directly with one another, as well as
with other securities firms.  ECNs are operated by companies that
are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as “bro-
ker-dealers” and that are members of the National Association of
Securities Dealers.  ECNs provide electronic agency brokerage ser-
vices, meaning that they match customer orders as agents, not prin-
cipals.  In other words, an order is executed if a matching order is
immediately available from another customer on the ECN.  If no
matching order is available, the order is displayed in the electronic
order “book” and becomes eligible for execution by orders entered by
other subscribers.  ECNs typically are compensated by commissions
paid by the seller and buyer in each transaction, generally on a per
share basis.  Another consequence of being an agency broker is that,
unlike Nasdaq market makers or exchange specialists, ECNs do not
trade for their own accounts.  In recent years, the SEC has estab-
lished special additional regulatory requirements applicable to ECNs,
as well as to other “alternative trading systems.” [19 December 2001]
ECNs clearly have the ability to bypass market makers and trade with each
other.  As such, they can participate as Walrasian auctioneers, and by their “shop-
ping,” can find the intrinsic value at which the market will clear.  Moreover, because
their orders may not be directly submitted to a market maker (or group of market
makers), their private information is less likely to be revealed.  This provides a mo-
tivation for obtaining costly private information, and is a solution to the Grossman
and Stiglitz [1980] problem where individuals have limited motivation to obtain pri-
vate information.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper shows that competitive dealers can use average demand to form an
equilibrium price identical to that established in a rational expectations (Walrasian)
market.  The resulting equilibrium price is strong-form efficient and the revision603 COMPETITIVE MARKETS AND AGGREGATE INFORMATION
process is partially Bayesian.  The role of competitive dealers is to aggregate infor-
mation fully and rationally so that, ex post, agents have homogeneous expectations.
The evolution of the capital markets literature has been to first assume that
markets are efficient and provide countless studies corroborating that school of
thought.  When anomalies began to surface, however, a stream of studies (theoreti-
cal and empirical) that considered the quality of information and behavior of agents
originated.  This research mostly assumed rational expectations Walrasian markets
and, as a result, abstracted itself from the reality of different market structures.
The results of this analysis have implications for the study of markets because they
show that the Walrasian market assumption of prior studies is not absurd since an
equally efficient price can be derived in a system such as the NASDAQ.  The ineffi-
ciencies in the market therefore, are not necessarily a direct result of the market
structure–rather, they can be a result of the quality of information being used to
form prices, or the behavior of market participants.
APPENDIX
Expectation of payoff value by conditioning on a sufficient statistic:
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as shown in (5).
Preliminary results and definition of terms:
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For notational simplicity define the following
(i) h 1 =  2/( 2 + 1),  (ii)  h  = 1/ 2,
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End of preliminary results.604 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Formal Proof of Equilibrium Price (8a, b):
From (6) and substituting the preliminary results from above, summing over all
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 aggregate demand for informed traders is
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Dividing by n traders yields average demand for the risky asset
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Equation (7) states that  PP n X E Xn S
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 γ  in average demand where informed traders are
price takers, it follows that average equilibrium demand for the risky asset is
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Next, substitute for  X  and   in P0
c which gives price in terms of signals as in the
Walrasian market.  That is, (8a) obtains
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The remainder of the proof requires inputting  and simplifying to (8b).
NOTES
Thanks to Wayne Y. Lee, William Acar, and Iraj Fooladi for helpful comments.  The author is particu-
larly indebted to three anonymous referees and the editor of this Journal whose comments greatly
enhanced the final manuscript.  The author accepts responsibility for remaining errors.
1. Baigent [1997] shows that the assumption of agents’ idiosyncratic error terms as i.i.d. is not necessary
for price to be a sufficient statistic.  Under the condition that the correlation between agents’ errors is
   > 0 , price is still a sufficient statistic; however, convergence to a fully revealing price is not possible.
2. The following information was downloaded from http://www.nasdaq.com.  In this excerpt, the competi-
tive process of NASDAQ market makers and the formation of prices is described.  See below.
The Nasdaq Difference - Market Makers
Essential to Nasdaq’s market structure, Market Makers are independent dealers who actively com-
pete for investor orders by displaying quotations representing their buy and sell interest—plus cus-
tomer limit orders—in Nasdaq-listed stocks. Each Market Maker has equal access to Nasdaq’s trading
system, which broadcasts their quotations simultaneously to all market participants. By standing ready
to buy and sell shares of a company’s stock, Market Makers provide to Nasdaq-listed companies a
unique service. The result of their combined sponsorship helps meet investor demand and creates an
environment of immediate and continuous trading. Currently, more than 500 market making firms
provide capital support for Nasdaq-listed stocks. All are required to:
· Disclose their buy and sell interest by displaying two-sided quotes in all stocks in which they
choose to make a market.
· Display both quotes and orders in Nasdaq, in compliance with the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Order Handling Rules.
· Honor their quoted prices and report trading in a timely manner. Failure to do so can lead to
disciplinary action.
3.  Thanks is given to an anonymous referee for suggesting the inclusion of this discussion.
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